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Private Equity is rapidly growing as an asset class for investors in South Africa. Local and international literature 
presents overwhelming evidence to suggest that Private Equity offers superior risk-adjusted returns and portfolio 
diversification benefits. 
 
This study addresses the question of how exactly Private Equity managers are able to achieve superior returns. A sample 
of 46 individual completed investments representing large buy-outs in South Africa in the period 1992 to 2007 was 
selected and analysed to quantitatively investigate the relationship between some of the identified sources of return and 
the realised internal rates of return in the case of each investment. These relationships were not found to be as strong as 
expected and in many cases were not supportive of the findings in the literature. Only earnings growth and an increase in 
the earnings multiple had a significant impact on the internal rates of return achieved according to the sample analysed. 
 
The authors conclude that investing in Private Equity is too interdisciplinary to distil the sources of return into a few 
concise elements. Proprietary knowledge, expertise, superior management skills, relationships and experience all seem to 
play a role in providing Private Equity managers with a competitive edge over their public market participants. 
 
 





As enigmatic as the asset class is to many investors, Private 
Equity is gaining prominence in the South African market at 
a pace equaled by very few, if any, other asset classes. 
 
At the end of 2007 funds under Private Equity management 
totaled R86,6 billion. This is equal to 2,8% of Gross 
Domestic Product, compared to the international average of 
2,1%. Since 1999, funds under management increased at a 
compound annual growth rate of 14%. For 2007 South 
African Private Equity ranked 11th on the global rankings of 
Private Equity investment activity (KPMG & SAVCA, 
2008). Hence, there is no disputing the relevance of Private 
Equity as an alternative investment category in South 
Africa. The strong growth in Private Equity is 
predominantly spurred by the superior risk-adjusted returns 
and the portfolio diversification benefits the asset class 
offers.  
 
Missankov, Van Dyk, Van Biljon, Hayes and Van der Veen 
(2006) did a comprehensive study of the investment 
performance of a representative sample set of 11 South 
African Private Equity funds over a 13-year period. In 
summarising their findings the authors conclude that, 
amongst others, Private Equity in South Africa: 
 
 Outperformed the FTSE/JSE All Share Index by 
18,0% per year before fees, and approximately 
12,0% per year after consideration of fees. 
 
 Produced good risk-adjusted performance relative 
to other asset classes as suggested by calculated 
Sharpe ratios. 
 
 Displayed low correlation in investment 
performance with that of other conventional asset 
classes. 
 
 Offers substantial diversification benefits to 
portfolios. 
 
Several international studies also suggest that Private Equity 
delivers superior risk-adjusted returns, although there seems 
to be a general consensus that the outperformance is lower 
in larger and more developed markets compared to 
developing markets. 
 
Given this background, the interesting question to ask is 
how exactly do Private Equity managers achieve these 
superior returns? With Private Equity fund managers 
charging at least 2% per year on committed capital and a 
further 20% of performance in carried interest, an investor 
would want to be sure of what benefits he or she is actually 
paying for. Furthermore, if it is possible to distil the sources 




Equity fund managers, it will assist in the fund manager 
selection process and possibly in the culmination of more 
aligned remuneration schemes for Private Equity fund 
managers. 
 
The existing pool of knowledge regarding the specific 
sources of superior returns in Private Equity is limited and 
opinions vary. Little has been done from a quantitative 
research perspective. 
 
This study investigates the methods that Private Equity fund 
managers use to achieve their returns. Sources of return 
which will be investigated can generally be classified as 
qualitative or quantitative.  
 
As far as the qualitative factors are concerned, a study of 
both international as well as local literature is discussed in 
Section 2. For the quantitative factors, a multiple regression 
analysis has been done to determine the relevance of each 
variable in respect of the returns achieved. The data and 
methodology are reviewed in Section 3, whereas the results 
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the study 
and makes a number of suggestions for future research. 
 
Literature review of qualitative factors 
 
While the overwhelming majority of research suggests that 
Private Equity delivers superior risk-adjusted returns, the 
research done on the sources of these returns is limited. 
Some arguments surface repeatedly, while others stand 
isolated in their opinion. What is evident, however, is the 
lack of comprehensive academic research which 
scientifically supports or rejects any of the proposed sources 
of superior return. This literature review aims to identify and 
briefly describe as many as possible of the suggested ways 
Private Equity fund managers use to achieve their returns. 
 
The format of this review will be to discuss the literature 




When two or more Private Equity firms mutually take part 
in an investment opportunity, the situation is referred to as 
syndication. During 2007, 80% of the ten largest Private 
Equity transactions reported in South Africa were done by 
Private Equity syndicates working together (KPMG & 
SAVCA, 2008:31). 
 
Lockett and Wright (2001) identified three rationales for 
syndicating. 
 
 According to the finance-based rationale, Private 
Equity firms can reduce the unsystematic risks of their 
investments by sharing the financial risk. Syndication 
enables the Private Equity manager to have a more 
diversified portfolio which results in total risk 
consisting almost exclusively of systematic risk. 
Furthermore, Private Equity investments are usually 
less liquid in nature than those in the stock market. By 
syndicating, the liquidity risk can be spread on a deal-
by-deal basis. 
 The resource-based rationale has two parts. Firstly, by 
syndicating, Private Equity firms have access to a 
larger pool of specialised resources such as financial 
expertise and market information. This will enable a 
syndicated team to make a better selection of the 
companies they decide to invest in, greatly reducing 
firm-specific risk in the process and enhancing the 
probability of superior returns. The second part argues 
that the syndicate can select more experienced and 
specialised skills from their combined resources in the 
ex-post management of their investments. 
 
 A third reason is the deal flow rationale. By 
successfully working together on deals, Private Equity 
firms increase the likelihood of being asked to 
participate in future investments by other firms. For 
firms with a good reputation in syndication, this 
increases the amount of opportunities to select from for 
future investments. 
 
A study done by Bent, Williams and Gilbert (2004) on 
South African Private Equity firms found the reasons for 
syndication to be consistent with these rationales. 
 
The most important reason for syndication was the large size 
of the investment relative to the amount of funds available. 
The second most important reason was the large size of the 
investment relative to the average investment size of the 
Private Equity firm. Both of these motivations fall under the 
finance-based rationale. Increasing future deal flow 
opportunities was the third most important reason. In the 
fourth place firms indicated the need to access specific 
skills, thus the resource-based rationale. A final reason, 
which is unique to South Africa, is the role of Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) in the drive to syndicate. 
 
The authors concluded that syndicated investments 
generally have higher rates of return than stand-alone 
investments, implying that the involvement of multiple 
firms in the management of the investment is a value adding 
exercise (Bent et al., 2004:46) 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
 
The Codes of Good Practice for Broad-Based BEE stipulate 
the conditions under which the investee company may treat 
the ownership held by a Private Equity fund as if being held 
by black people. The requirements under these codes are 
issued by the Department of Trade and Industry and were 
finalised in June 2007, providing clarity as to how Private 
Equity fund managers can further their BEE goals. 
 
BEE continues to play a vital role in South African Private 
Equity activity (Dada & Thayser, 2007). Deloitte (2007:5) 
found that the majority (83%) of Private Equity investment 
professionals expect their funds to have some form of BEE 
ranging from black influence to black control. 80% of 
respondents feel that BEE will generate more opportunities 
for their Private Equity businesses. 
 
Although it is difficult to prove empirically, role players 






 enabling Private Equity fund managers to acquire 
ownership at a discount to ordinary transactions. 
 
 giving access to more sources of debt at lower prices. 
 
 improving the earnings of the investee company due to 
better BEE credentials in sectors where BEE 




Leverage can be described as the Debt:Equity ratio of the 
investee company. Private Equity fund managers can decide 
to alter the leverage of the investee company by selling 
assets or by refinancing existing assets, amongst others. 
Most literature sources suggest that leverage is one of the 
main methods employed by Private Equity fund managers to 
achieve superior returns (Barber & Goold, 2007:54; Farzard, 
Goldstein, Henry & Palmeri, 2007; Kiechel, 2007:19; 
Millson & Ward, 2005:79; Rogers, Holland & Haas, 
2002:98; Missankov et al., 2006:26; Vanek, 2005:9). 
 
Private Equity fund managers’ aggressive use of debt and 
the sale of assets, sometimes referred to as asset-stripping, is 
criticised by some commentators as being a short-sighted 
approach and seems to have gathered a negative perception 
by many outside the industry. However, studies by Deloitte 
(2007) and Ernst & Young (2008) state that Private Equity 
fund managers achieved their returns from a far wider set of 
inter-disciplinary skills of which increased leverage is 
merely one of the tools. 
 
The most common method of measuring Private Equity 
investment returns is by calculating the Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) on the money invested by the fund manager. 
Increased debt can improve this measure in two ways 
(Fraser-Sampson, 2007). Firstly, debt can be used to acquire 
ownership in the investee company, hence reducing the 
amount of own funds used for the same amount of 
ownership. Secondly, the IRR depends on the timing of the 
cash flows. The quicker cash is returned to the investor, the 
higher his IRR. Private Equity fund managers can increase 
the investee company’s debt and use the cash flow for early 
repayment, increasing IRR in the process. 
 
Another advantage of higher leverage is the tax advantages 





Two common metrics used in Private Equity are Enterprise 
Value and Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and 
Amortisation (EBITDA). Consider the following: 
 




Enterprise Value = EBITDA x P/EBITDA Multiple 
 
By selling the investment at a higher multiple compared to 
the multiple at which the investment was made, Private 
Equity fund managers are able to increase the market value 
of equity and consequently their returns.  
 
Some proponents argue that the multiple increases achieved 
by Private Equity fund managers are merely a result of the 
overall increases experienced in the general market 
multiples. However, a study done by Ernst & Young 
(2008:4) reveals that Enterprise Value for the 100 largest 
Private Equity exits during 2007 grew at a compound annual 
growth rate of 24% compared to the 12% achieved by public 
company benchmarks. 
 
On multiple growth, the study (Ernst & Young, 2008:9) 
concluded: “More than half of all multiple growth charted 
for the top exits was attributable to the success of strategies 
implemented under Private Equity ownership. Strategic 
repositioning into more attractive areas, a track record of 
improved profits and cash flows, demonstration of better 
growth prospects, and contracts to underpin more certain 
cash flows all contributed to multiple growth. Put simply, 
after owning them for several years, it is clear that Private 





The most popular measure of earnings in Private Equity 
investments is EBITDA (Fraser-Sampson, 2007). Increasing 
earnings is not an individual action, but rather the result of 
many different interdependent techniques applied to the 
investee company. However, the relevant issue, as suggested 
by the literature (Barber & Goold, 2007; Ernst & Young, 
2008; Kiechel, 2007; Rogers et al., 2002), is that Private 
Equity managers tend to increase earnings at a higher rate 
than their benchmarks.  
 
Ernst & Young (2008:8) found that the EBITDA compound 
annual growth rate for 2007 was approximately 16% for the 
top 100 Private Equity exits internationally compared with 
the 10% achieved by public companies.  
 
By applying their knowledge and skills, Private Equity fund 





Corporate governance is increasingly accepted globally as 
being a very important risk management tool. Research done 
by Gill (2001) suggests that investors are willing to pay 
significant premiums for companies that are well-governed. 
These businesses are typically viewed as being less risky 
and therefore premiums can be demanded. Millson and 
Ward (2005:73) confirm that companies with a reputation 
for good corporate governance have been found to have 
higher price/earnings multiples and other improved metrics. 
 
Moolenschot (2002) investigated corporate governance in 
South African Private Equity investments by interviewing 




investors surveyed all felt that good governance in investee 
companies was of high importance, and that well governed 
companies presented better probabilities of successful 
investment. Private Equity fund managers impose good 
corporate governance on their investments in their quest for 
superior returns. 
 
Private Equity representatives who sit on the boards of 
investee companies place the shareholder at the centre of 
decision making and act as unsentimental owners who are 
involved in the hiring and firing of management, and do not 
hesitate to sell the company when the price is right (Rogers 
et al., 2002). Private Equity managers consciously strive to 
avoid corporate governance for corporate governance’s 
sake, but to rather focus on governance which contributes to 





Having the right management in investee companies is one 
of the dominant sources of the superior returns achieved by 
Private Equity. Barber and Goold (2007:60), Ernst & Young 
(2008:12), Millson and Ward (2005:79), Moolenschot 
(2002:77) and Rogers et al. (2002) found that having 
appropriate and superior management was a prerequisite for 
successful investments. Research done by Millson and Ward 
(2005) on the relevant importance of specific attributes 
relating to the agent-principal relationship indicates that 
Private Equity managers are overwhelmingly concerned 
with the strength of the management team. 
 
Aligning the interests of management and owners is of 
utmost importance to Private Equity managers. Ernst & 
Young (2008:12) suggest that incentives that motivate 
managers to behave like owners are at the heart of the 
Private Equity value proposition. 
 
According to Millson and Ward (2005) there are three 
mechanisms used by Private Equity firms to incentivise the 
management of their portfolio companies: 
 
 Having relatively large amounts of debt imposes a 
strong discipline on management and ensures that 
management treats capital, particularly equity capital, 
as costly. 
 
 Providing management with significant equity 
ownership and granting extra equity based on 
performance. 
 
 Relating management’s compensation directly to the 
performance of the business. 
 
Because all the investments made by Private Equity fund 
managers are liquidated during the life of the fund, it is 
easier to measure the precise performance of the investee 
company and hence easier to tie management incentives 
directly to company performance (Barber & Goold, 
2007:55). 
 
Apart from having exceptional management in place and 
aligning the interests of management with that of the 
owners, Private Equity firms also ensure that returns are 
generated through the managerial disciplines they impose on 
their acquired businesses. Rogers et al. (2002) studied more 
than 2000 Private Equity transactions over a period of ten 
years and suggest that Private Equity managers mainly 
apply four managerial disciplines to achieve superior 
returns: 
 
 They define an investment thesis which is a clear and 
simple statement of how they will increase business 
value within three to four years. Every action the 
company takes is then guided by this investment thesis. 
 
 Private Equity firms are wary of excessive financial 
measurement and have some general preferences of the 
measures they track. Cash is monitored more closely 
than earnings as cash is considered a better indicator of 
true financial performance. Another preferred measure 
is return on invested capital rather than other return 
measures. Management’s compensation is then linked 
directly to these measures. 
 
 Fund managers work the balance sheet by relying 
heavily on debt financing. In doing so they ensure that 
cash is viewed as a scarce resource and that equity 
works harder. 
 
 They adopt a strong shareholder-centric focus. Private 
Equity corporate staff view themselves as active 
shareholders in the businesses they hold, obligated to 





Timing refers to the endeavour of Private Equity firms to 
select their timing of investing and timing of selling their 
investment in such a way as to achieve additional return on 
investment. As the general market goes through cycles, 
businesses in general tend to fluctuate in market value as 
valuation multiples increase and decrease in sympathy with 
the general market. If Private Equity firms are able to time 
the market by buying companies when the general valuation 
is lower and then select to sell at times when the general 
valuation is higher, timing will be a source of superior 
return. 
 
Studies indicate that some Private Equity managers do 
incorporate the technique of timing successfully to a certain 
extent. In the words of the Ernst & Young (2008:9) study: 
“The ability to select favourable exit timing and to be 
nimble sellers is a source of Private Equity success, as 
previous studies in this series have found.” 
 
Goldman Sachs Asset Management (2007:1) suggests that 
during periods of general cyclical down moves of the 
market, Private Equity firms tend to extend their holding 
period of portfolio companies in the hope that better future 
market conditions might provide better exits. 
 
Ernst & Young (2008:11) differed from this view and found 





underperforming companies which were given extra time to 
perform rather than business cycle hostages. 
 
The literature does tend to indicate that Private Equity 
returns are influenced by market movements. Cochrane 
(2005), Kaplan and Schoar (2005), and Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003) determined that returns of Private Equity 
funds appear to be highly correlated with the returns on the 
market as a whole (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner & Scharfstein, 
2008:2). 
 
Gompers et al. (2008) analysed more than 30 000 Private 
Equity firms over a period of 20 years. They found that 
there was a definite differentiation of timing-related 
investment behaviour between experienced and 
inexperienced Private Equity firms. The greatest response to 
public market shifts was by specialised Private Equity firms 
with considerable industry experience. Shifts in public 
markets provide information to Private Equity firms, but not 
all firms were able to utilise this information to their 
advantage and only those firms with superior human capital 
resources capitalised by using the information for timing 
purposes. 
 
According to Gompers et al. (2008), firms with less 
experience also attempted to alter their investment 
behaviour in response to market cycles, but for these firms it 
did not translate into superior returns. Experience, industry-
specific knowledge and human ability resulted in firms with 
the most experience to post superior returns by using public 
market signals as investment opportunities. 
 
Superior knowledge, experience and skill 
 
Private Equity firms make use of their superior knowledge 
and skill in two ways in order to increase returns. The first 
stage is the identification of the investment opportunity and 
the second phase is the ex-post management of the investee 
company. Gompers et al. (2008:2) make the observation that 
the most experienced Private Equity firms generally record 
the best performance. Kaplan and Schoar (2005:1792) found 
that underlying heterogeneity in the skill and quality of fund 
managers leads to differences in performance and also found 
the persistence of performance to be correlated with the skill 
and quality of the fund managers. 
 
Fund managers build up relationships and networks over 
time and through the high level of activity and turnover of 
invested portfolio companies. They use their extensive 
networks of business and financial connections, including 
potential bidding partners, to find new deals (Barber & 
Goold, 2007:60). In some cases the investee company might 
be willing to sell their shares to the Private Equity firm at a 
lower price purely due to the value they can add by using 
their networks. Buying companies more cheaply than other 
role players would certainly contribute to higher returns for 
Private Equity firms. Ernst & Young (2008:12) found that 
during 2007, 82% of the investments in sample companies 
were originated proactively through relationships with the 
investee’s management, calls from the fund manager’s 
networks, or company and sector tracking. Many role 
players argue that, unlike mutual funds or hedge funds, 
Private Equity investors have proprietary access to particular 
transactions (Kaplan & Schoar, 2005:1792). 
 
After identifying certain possible investments, Private 
Equity players also display their skill and knowledge 
through the process of a proper due diligence. 
Moolenschot’s (2002) research confirmed the premium 
managers place on due diligence in assessing a target 
company’s level of corporate governance. The due diligence 
done by Private Equity firms reflects a full scope analysis of 
financial and non-financial issues. 
 
Furthermore, the superior skills and knowledge of the 
human capital involved as well as the experience gained 
through the high volume of deals translate into Private 
Equity firms having the ability to value a company and 
predict cash flows much more accurately than other 
investors (Barber & Goold, 2007:60). 
 
During the ex-post management of the investee company, 
Private Equity firms once again use their substantial 
networks and relationships to employ and retain the absolute 
best managers for achieving their goals.  
 
Gompers et al. (2008:2) summarise the importance of 
superior knowledge, experience and skill as a source of 
superior return very well when they assert: “This result 
points to the importance of industry-specific human capital 
and suggests that a critical part of venture capital investing 
is the network of industry contacts to identify good 
investment opportunities as well as know-how to manage 
and add value to these investments. These contacts and 
know-how come only from long standing experience doing 
deals in an industry.” 
 
Public vs private requirements 
 
Public companies which are listed on exchanges have 
implicit and explicit requirements that put them at a 
disadvantage towards Private Equity portfolio companies. 
 
Firstly, the costs related to having and keeping a public 
company listed on the exchange are high. Private companies 
avoid these costs. 
 
Secondly, public companies have very stringent reporting 
requirements. A lot of effort, time and management go into 
satisfying these requirements. Furthermore, public 
companies also have the burden of the extremely expensive 
reporting costs. Deloitte (2007:2) highlights the removal of 
these costs and requirements as an important aspect in the 
ability of Private Equity to create value. 
 
Finally, public firms are torn between their long-term goals 
of creating value and their short-term goals of reporting 
quarterly to an audience which focuses on short-term 
financial improvements. Indeed, Rogers et al. (2002) argue 
that the ability of Private Equity managers to think medium-
term in their portfolio companies gives them a competitive 
advantage by removing the counterproductive focus on short 
term numbers and still creating an urgency to transform the 
business. Out of the public eye, Private Equity firms actually 




of the investment, positioning the company for growth and 
enabling them to reap greater rewards later on. 
 
Productivity and cost cutting 
 
Increased productivity and cost cutting would manifest in 
increased earnings and hence higher returns. A dominant 
point of view in the literature is that Private Equity firms 
have a strong and relentless focus on cutting costs at 
investee companies. However, they are not constrained 
when it comes to spending and investing to improve 
productivity and future growth prospects. 
 
Productivity can be measured as the ratio of production 
inputs to revenue, profits or other outputs. Private Equity 
firms generate better returns by increasing the productivity 
of their portfolio companies and achieving higher 
productivity levels than public company benchmarks. The 
Ernst & Young (2008:2) study found that for 2007, Private 
Equity investments which were sold had 33% higher 
productivity levels than public companies. Private Equity 
managers increased revenue in their portfolio companies 
while managing costs and headcount. Even where investee 
companies clearly added employees, the ratio of EBITDA to 
headcount mostly improved. 
 
Sources of acquisition 
 
It can be argued that the sources of acquiring companies for 
investment lie at the centre of Private Equity’s ability to 
generate superior returns. Returning to the definition of 
Private Equity, it is evident that a very large difference 
between this asset class and public companies lies in the fact 
that most of the companies acquired by Private Equity firms 
are unlisted, privately owned enterprises. Many private 
companies do not have the managerial knowledge and skill 
to perform optimally. They are usually relatively unknown 
with few objective valuations of the company and are very 
thinly traded (Anson, 2007:7). Furthermore, if mispricing is 
present, it will be more significant amongst the illiquid 
private companies compared to public companies. Private 
Equity firms use their skills to identify and buy underpriced 
private companies and then increase the performance of 
such companies. The ability to generate superior returns 
might thus also originate from this unique opportunity 
which few other investors or asset classes have. 
 
Private Equity firms can choose to invest in private 
companies, public companies which they then take private, 
or by buying secondary investments from other Private 
Equity investors. 
 
In analysing the sources of acquisition, Ernst & Young 
(2008:7) found that during 2007 private company 
acquisitions performed best with an Enterprise Value growth 
of 32%. This was followed by companies bought as 
secondary investments with an average growth of 27%. 
Where Private Equity firms bought public companies and 
took them private, the Enterprise Value growth averaged 
only 17%. All these figures compare to public company 
benchmark growth of 12%. It is evident that Private Equity 
managers can use their unique ability to invest in private 
companies to achieve superior returns for their investors. 
Other sources of return 
 
The possible sources of return mentioned are the factors 
which were conspicuous in the literature. However, this by 
no means implies that the methods Private Equity managers 
employ to achieve superior returns are limited to these 
attributes. During the course of the research, the authors also 
identified other, albeit probably less important, sources of 
return. These include the positive spin-offs investees might 
experience from having a new reputable shareholder 
(Moolenschot, 2002), synergies that different portfolio 
companies might unlock amongst each other (Barber & 
Goold, 2007), effects of controlling ownership,  creative 
financial engineering on the part of fund managers (Boyer & 
Baigent, 2008, Goldman Sachs Asset Management, 2008:9), 
and investing in secondary investments (HarbourVest, 
2008:1). 
 
Although the list of origins of Private Equity returns will 
never be complete, it is important to realise that these factors 
are seldom independent and mostly interdependent. The 
question to answer is whether any of these factors can be 
proven to have a significant impact on the returns achieved 
by the Private Equity firm on an individual investment basis. 
This issue is addressed in the following section. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
The selected sample consists of the completed and exited 
individual investments made by a number of the largest 
Private Equity fund managers with the longest track records 
in South Africa. Due to confidentiality restrictions the 
identities of the players are withheld. Reliable data about 
Private Equity investments is extremely difficult to obtain 
and the authors sincerely hope that the Private Equity 
industry in South Africa will strive towards greater 
transparency which will ultimately benefit the industry as a 
whole in the longer term. The sample contains 54 Private 
Equity transactions over a period of 15 years. The first 
transaction was entered into during July 1992 and the last 
transaction was exited during July 2007. 
 
For each transaction, the following information was 
received from the Private Equity managers: 
 
 Gross IRR 
 Total Investment Cost 
 Ownership Percentage 
 Enterprise Value at entry 
 Percentage Debt at entry 
 EBITDA at entry 
 Price/EBITDA multiple at entry 
 JSE ALSI Price / Earnings (PE) ratio at entry 
 Exit date 
 Holding Period in years 
 Enterprise Value at exit 
 EBITDA at exit 
 Price/EBITDA multiple at exit 
 JSE ALSI PE at exit 
 
All exited investments were included in the data. 





negative IRR’s. Hence the authors do not expect the data to 
suffer from survivorship bias. Where data was incomplete in 
the sample, that specific investment was omitted from the 
sample. Due to incomplete data, the sample shrank to 48 
investments. 
 
Data was provided by Momentum Wealth and FRAIM 
(FirstRand Alternative Investment Management) who 
obtained it from the Private Equity managers. All the data 
are self-reported by the Private Equity managers. Hence the 
authors do not take responsibility for any data which might 
have been calculated incorrectly or reported inaccurately. 
This is especially relevant regarding the IRR’s reported by 
the managers. 
 
Descriptive statistics were calculated and histograms were 
constructed for some of the fields to shed more light on the 
investments and activities of the Private Equity Fund 
managers. Two definite outliers were found. An investment 
in the technology sector had an IRR of 573% p.a. and an 
investment in the construction sector had an IRR of 620% 
p.a. The total investment costs of R13,1 million and R5 
million respectively were relatively small compared to the 
average total investment cost of R72 million. These sample 
statistics were omitted from the sample to prevent skewing 
of the results, reducing the data set to 46 cases.  
 
The main part of the analysis concentrates on a multiple 
regression. Reported IRR’s are used as the dependent 





The reported IRR’s were regressed with the following 
independent variables according to ordinary least squares 
regression: 
 
 Ownership percentage 
 Debt percentage 
 Holding Period in years 
 EBITDA Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 
percentage 
 Earnings Multiple Value Extraction ratio 
 Short-term Interest Rates at Entry 
 Total Investment Cost (millions of rand) 
 Enterprise Value at Entry 
 
Before doing the regression, scatter plots for the dependent 
variable and each independent variable were constructed. 
For each scatter plot a linear trend line was added to 
determine the nature of the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable by visual inspection. 
Where the relationship was found to be non-linear, a 
logarithmic trend line was added. 
 
Based on this analysis it was decided to use the natural log 
of the following independent variables: 
 
 Ownership percentage 
 Holding Period in years 
 Earnings Multiple Value Extraction ratio 
 Total Investment Cost (millions of rand) 




The regression results are depicted in Table 1. 
 
The resulting regression equation is as follows: 
 
Y =  54,72 + 13,23(LN Ownership) – 0,15(Debt) – 
13,74(LN Holding Period) + 0,60(EBITDA CAGR) + 
22,26(LN Earnings Multiple Value Extraction) – 
2,35(ST Interest Rates) – 18,40(LN Total Investment 
Cost) + 10,93(LN Enterprise Value)  … (1) 
 
According to the Significant F value of almost 0, at least one 
of the independent variables explains a significant portion of 
the variation of the reported IRR’s. However, looking at the 
multiple coefficient of determination, R Squared, only 58% 
of the variation in IRR is collectively explained by all of the 
independent variables. Adjusted R Squared, the coefficient 
of determination adjusted for the amount of variables, is 
considerably lower at only 49%. Hence the model as a 
whole does not have a particularly good fit and the use of 
the model for predicting IRR’s by using the independent 
variables is limited. 
 
Before testing the statistical significance of each of the 
coefficients, the model was tested for multicollinearity. This 
condition distorts the standard error of estimate and the 
coefficient standard errors, leading to problems when 
conducting t-tests for statistical significance of parameters 
(DeFusco, McLeavy, Pinto & Runkle, 2004). A correlation 
matrix was constructed and is represented in Table 2. 
 
It was decided to do a stepwise regression in an attempt to 
minimise any multicollinearity which might be present. The 
stepwise regression yielded the following equation: 
 
Y =  61,84 - 20,34(LN Holding Period) + 0,62(EBITDA 
CAGR) + 22,62(LN Earnings Multiple Value 
Extraction) … (2) 
 
The R Squared was 53%, which is weaker than R Squared 
of the multiple regression. However, the Adjusted R-
Squared was the same as that of the multiple regression at 
49%. Also note that the coefficients of EBITDA CAGR and 
Earnings Multiple Value Extraction were very similar to the 













df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 8 32063.74044 4007.967555 6.387889109 3.34865E-05
Residual 37 23214.99278 627.4322373
Total 45 55278.73322
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 54.71683406 64.73877693 0.845194127 0.403435006
LN Ownership 13.23337741 15.31720332 0.863955197 0.393178948
Debt -0.152065047 0.252842326 -0.601422436 0.551226013
LN Holding Period -13.73714379 10.90153101 -1.260111426 0.215519090
EBITDA CAGR 0.601310255 0.221647915 2.712907331 0.010062942
LN Multiple Value Extraction 22.25859051 5.642844887 3.94456891 0.000343129
ST Interest Rates -2.351982377 2.069123555 -1.136704655 0.262970348
LN Total Investment Cost -18.39547618 12.22382003 -1.504887681 0.140842542  
 



















LN Ownership 1 0
Debt 0 1 1 0
LN Holding Period 0 5 -0 3 1 0
EBITDA CAGR -0 4 -0 3 -0 2 1 0
LN Multiple Value Extraction 0 0 0 1 -0 2 -0 3 1 0
ST Interest Rates 0 2 -0 3 0 6 0 0 0 0 1 0
LN Total Investment Cost 0 3 0 0 0 2 -0 1 -0 3 -0 1 1 0
LN Enterprise Value -0 1 0 1 -0 1 0 0 -0 3 -0 3 0 9 1 0  
 
 
Each of the coefficients was tested for statistical 
significance. As revealed by the p-values in Table 1, at the 
5% significance level it was found that only the following 
variables’ coefficients were significantly different from 0 
under the multiple regression: 
 
 EBITDA CAGR 
 LN Earnings Multiple Value Extraction 
 
Considering the stepwise regression, LN Holding Period 
was also found to be significantly different form 0 at the 5% 
significance level. 
 
We will now discuss each of the independent variables used 




Ownership refers to the percentage of shares owned by the 
general and limited partners collectively through whichever 
vehicles they might choose in the underlying investee 
company. For the purpose of this study, control is defined as 
an ownership stake of more than 50%. Descriptive statistics 
revealed that the average level of ownership was 44% while 
the median was 34%. Hence, it seems that on average, 
Private Equity managers do not tend to buy controlling 
stakes in the underlying investee companies. Looking at the 
scatter plot of the relationship between ownership and IRR 
(Figure 1), it seems that there might be a negative 
relationship between the two. However, with a p-value of 
0,39 there is almost no evidence to suggest that there is any 
relationship between the level of shareholding and the return 
achieved by the Private Equity manager. The analysis does 
not support the argument that managers achieve higher 






























The level of leverage had a p-value of 0,55, suggesting there 
is no relationship between the debt employed and the returns 
on the investment.  
 
An inspection of Figures 2 and 4 shows that one investment 
generated an IRR of 155% p.a. with 0% debt and an 
EBITDA CAGR of only 4,8% p.a. On investigation it was 
found that the inception date of this investment in the 
technology sector was November 1995 and that the 
EBITDA multiple was 3,8. The investment was sold at the 
height of the technology boom in February 2000 at an 





















Figure 2: IRR and debt scatter plot 
Holding period 
 
The scatter plot in Figure 3 indicates a negative relationship 
between holding period and IRR. According to the p-value a 
negative relationship exists at the 22% level of significance 
under the multiple regression model. However, the stepwise 
regression revealed that a significant relationship between 
the Holding Period of investments and the IRR does indeed 
exist.  This is consistent with the concept of early repayment  
in the Private Equity industry where earlier cash flows result 
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Figure 3: IRR and holding period scatter plot 
Earnings growth 
 
There was overwhelming evidence in the analysis to suggest 
that higher earnings growth leads to higher rates of return. 
Hence, the sample supports the findings that Private Equity 
managers strive to boost their returns by using methods at 
their disposal to increase the earnings of the investee 
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Figure 4: IRR and EBITDA CAGR scatter plot 
 
Earnings multiple increase 
 
According to the analysis the positive relationship between 
earnings multiple increases achieved by managers and the 
returns realised is almost 100%. Some managers were able 
to buy at lower earnings multiples than the market, others 
were able to sell at higher earnings multiples than the 
market, and some were able to do both. It is evident that an 
increase in the earnings multiple is one of the most 
important sources of superior returns for Private Equity 
firms. Some proponents might question whether growth in 
the earnings multiple is not simply an alternative measure of 
success rather than a strategy for success. In such a case, 
Earnings Multiple Increase should be dropped as an 
independent variable and possibly be added as a dependent 
variable. Here one needs to consider the way in which 
Private Equity fund managers operate. They intentionally 
use their networks and negotiation skills to drive the 
purchase price as low as possible, and then explore several 
exit strategies such as listing on the stock exchange at high 
earnings multiples or actively marketing and negotiating a 
high exit price from a large pool of potential buyers. Hence, 
the authors are satisfied that this remains a key independent 






















Earnings multiple value extraction
IRR and Earnings Multiple Value 
Extraction
 





There is nothing to infer that a significant relationship exists 
between the IRR of an investment and the interest rate at 
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Figure 6: IRR and ST interest rates scatter plot 
 
Size of investment 
 
Although there was a tendency for a higher frequency of 
smaller investments, there was no evidence to suggest that a 
significant relationship exists between investment size and 
the returns achieved. Private Equity managers therefore did 
not seem to be concerned about investment size as having an 
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The multiple regression done suggests that only earnings 
growth and earnings multiple increase displayed significant 
relationship with the returns achieved by the Private Equity 
managers on the investments included in the sample. 
Investors who would have bought the companies from the 
Private Equity firms usually place considerable emphasis on 
future cash flows when evaluating a company for 
investment. As higher earnings growth translates into higher 
future cash flow, it is obvious that Private Equity managers 
were able to sell companies with higher earnings growth 
potential at higher multiples. Hence, all the arguments can 
be reduced to one single source of superior return – earnings 
growth. Even so, the model’s fit was not particularly 
convincing, explaining only 49% of the variability in the 
reported IRR’s. 
 
So how do Private Equity managers achieve their superior 
returns? Is the source of superior Private Equity returns like 
a type of Holy Grail which is ever-elusive? It is the view of 
the authors that the sources of superior Private Equity 
returns cannot be distilled in an empirical way. Private 
Equity investing is above all a highly specialised arena with 
a myriad of interdependent methods employed in order to 
take a business to a higher level and extracting the 
maximum from that investment. It is as much an art as it is a 
science. The individual techniques employed by managers 
to achieve superior returns will not be consistent, as every 
investment is unique and calls for an individualised 
approach. Herein lies the value-adding function of the 
Private Equity managers. They have the ability to assess 
each investment and each problem on its own merits in the 
ex-post management process, and then they use their 
superior knowledge, relationships, experience and 
exceptional management in an interrelated artful way to 
achieve a better outcome than their public market 
counterparts. 
 
Relatively little research has been done on Private Equity in 
South Africa so far. The most comprehensive research on 
the topic is probably the paper by Missankov et al., (2006). 






Much more research can be done to isolate the different 
factors contributing to IRR. It is noteworthy that such 
research could not been found by the authors in the 
international literature. The derivation of a model being able 
to compute the factor contributions seems to be the complex 
challenge. However, it would be interesting to see research 
where the contributions of earnings growth, earnings 
multiple growth, leverage, and cash flows are isolated. 
Another interesting extension of this study would be to test 
the explanatory power of the independent variables over a 
longer time period going forward by using the regression 
equation derived here. 
 
Finally, this study suggests that Private Equity managers 
don’t only extract short-term value from their investments, 
but that they actually sell much healthier and better 
companies than they bought in the first place. Research on 
the performance of South African Private Equity portfolio 
companies right after they were sold back into the public 
market compared with other public market benchmarks will 
shed informative light on this. Research done by Brooks, 
Ferreira and Harder (2002) might provide some insight into 
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